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Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1980–2002 Q1
WILLIAM M. CHANDLER, GARY W. COX and MATHEW
D. M CCUBBIN
We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government
parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll
rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second,
only opposition parties’ (and not government parties’) roll rates increase with
the distances of each party from the floor median. Third, almost all policy
moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during
periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties sky-
rocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties
plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being
nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 per
cent leftward under a leftist government.
INTRODUCTION
Governing coalitions in parliamentary democracies are famous for their voting cohe-
sion. Individual MPs rarely dissent from their party’s position, coalition partners
rarely disagree publicly, and the government’s programme thus proceeds through the
assembly on the strength of the coalition’s numerical superiority – simply outvoting
the opposition at every turn.
Iron discipline, however, is not a natural phenomenon. The component parties in
multiparty coalitions do not agree on all possible issues; they merely agree on all
issues actually considered in plenary sessions of the assembly.1 Thus, the high levels
of coalition discipline observed in roll call votes are as much a function of governmen-
tal agenda control – specifically, the ability of the coalition to prevent bills that would
split its members apart from being voted on the floor – as they are of the carrots and
sticks that governing parties use to whip their members into line.2
In some polities, such as France’s Fifth Republic,3 the government’s ability to
control the legislative agenda has clear institutional sources. In this article, we
explore agenda setting in Germany, a case in which the government’s institutional
control of the agenda might be questioned – given the tradition of seeking broad con-
sensus in the Council of Elders (the formal agenda-setting institution in the Bundestag)
and the frequency with which the government does not command a majority in the
second chamber (the Bundesrat). We argue that the Council of Elders seeks – and is
expected by the opposition to seek – only a procedural and not a substantive consen-
sus; that the government is relatively successful at patching together support in the
Bundesrat; and thus, that the most likely impediments to governmental agenda
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control in Germany are not serious in practice. We then show that the actual plenary
agenda in Germany is consistent with the notion that the governing coalition sets the
agenda, with little more constraint than is observed in other parliamentary cases.
AGENDA CONTROL AND LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE IN THE BUNDESTAG4
The Bundestag allocates committee chairs and other important offices proportionally
among all parties, without giving the governing coalition a bonus, as is common in
many other systems. Moreover, as already noted, the Council of Elders seeks, and
usually achieves, a consensus among all (or nearly all) parties regarding the plenary
agenda.5 It is rare that parties seek to add items to the plenary agenda and such attempts
almost always fail.6
Does the apparent consensus achieved in the Council of Elders mean the govern-
ment must avoid bills the opposition dislikes? Does it imply a kind of universalism
in which shifting coalitions take turns pushing bills onto the plenary agenda? In prac-
tice, as we shall see, it means neither of these things. The German government appears
willing and able to push through legislation that is fiercely opposed by the opposition.
Moreover, the only important bills that make it onto the plenary agenda are those sup-
ported, not by shifting majority coalitions, but by one particular majority coalition –
that composed of the governing parties.
How do governmental parties achieve agenda control given proportional allocation
of committee chairs and ‘consensual’ agenda formation?7 The answer is that govern-
mental parties control the agenda because:
(1) They hold a majority of seats in all the core working and leadership bodies of the
chamber, mainly the committees and the Council of Elders.
(2) The Council of Elders does not aim for a consensus on the substance of the bills to
be considered in the plenary session, but only on the details of how such bills
should be debated and voted. The opposition parties accept that the majority
should be allowed to control the substantive content of the bills that the govern-
ment sends to the Bundestag. Their demands only concern their ability to criticise
such proposals effectively.
(3) Challenges to the agenda set by the Council of Elders are decided by majority vote
in the Bundestag. Thus, the government parties can implement any agreement they
reach among themselves regarding what should and should not appear on the
agenda, if their representatives on the Council of Elders act in accord with the
coalition’s agreement (and their rank and file is willing to vote down attempts to
amend the government’s agenda on the floor).
Government Majorities
Regarding the government’s possession of a majority on all committees and in the
Council of Elders, the number of members from each parliamentary group on a com-
mittee is proportional to the size of the parliamentary group (and each fraction has dis-
cretion over which of its members will sit on each committee). Thus, as long as
governmental parties maintain a majority in the Bundestag (which has always been
the case), they have a majority on each committee.
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Committee chairs are allocated proportionally among all parties, meaning that the
government cannot always count on a sympathetic chair. The Bundestag can, however,
compel a committee to report on any matters referred to it within ten weeks.8 Thus,
chairs by themselves cannot block, although they may delay, the progress of
legislation.
The Council of Elders manages the internal affairs of the Bundestag. Some of the
most important agenda-setting functions of the Council are: deciding the agenda for the
coming year, deciding the distribution of committee chairs and deputy chairs among
fractions,9 and importantly deciding the plenary agenda for each coming week (the
items of business to be considered, whether there will be a debate, and the length
and structure of such a debate). The government has a majority in this leadership
body, just as it has a majority on committees and all other bodies of the chamber.10
The Meaning of Consensus
Turning now to the second and third points made above, what of the long tradition of
seeking consensus in the Council of Elders?11 Were this an ironclad rule, it might imply
that only bills approved by all parties could reach the plenary agenda. Our reading of
the matter is that difficulty in achieving substantive consensus on the merits of bills
brought forward by the government in the early 1950s led the Council to issue an
interpretation in 1955, allowing items to be added to the floor agenda by majority
vote on the floor.12 This ruling, we believe, made it clear that the government could
get its way, so long as it was internally united, even without a consensus in the
Council of Elders. It, therefore, reduced the scope of bargaining within the Council.
Opposition parties no longer sought to veto or delay government bills, but merely to
ensure that they had a fair chance to criticise those bills. Consensus in the Council
thus implies only procedural and not substantive agreement.
Divided Government
One final question is whether the government’s ability to control the agenda is lessened
when it does not command a majority in the second chamber. As Patzelt13 notes, ‘gov-
erning without control of the Bundesrat is quite common for German Chancellors’.
Moreover, many politicians and scholars in Germany believe that divided control of
the bicameral German parliament is causing gridlock reminiscent of the kind found
in the US.14,15
We shall show that divided government has a statistically discernible, yet small,
effect on the government’s ability to control the agenda and make policy. The effect
is small because the government manages to secure the support of the Bundesrat
even during divided government, by buying off the votes of La¨nder delegations to
whom it allocates funds in exchange for their support.
THE PROCEDURAL CARTEL THESIS
Agenda Cartels
In all democratic national assemblies of which we are aware, there are certain offices to
which special agenda powers attach. Only the speaker of the US House of
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Representatives, for example, can grant recognition for motions to suspend the rules.
Only ministers of the Crown can propose new taxes in the UK. Only the German
Council of Elders can advise the president regarding the plenary agenda.
We define an agenda cartel as a set of agents possessing two key properties. First,
they collectively hold a controlling share of the agenda-setting offices in the assembly.
Thus, just as an economic cartel collectively monopolises an economic resource, such
as steel, so too does an agenda cartel collectively monopolise a legislative resource,
agenda-setting offices. Second, the cartel establishes a procedure for scheduling propo-
sals for plenary debate and vote. Whether decentralised or centralised, formal or infor-
mal, this procedure amounts to investing k groups within the cartel, labeled C1, . . . , Ck,
with vetoes over the placement of proposals upon the plenary agenda.
One subspecies of agenda cartel – which we call a parliamentary agenda cartel – is
of particular concern here. In parliamentary systems, it is often said that each pivotal
party in a multi-party majority coalition wields an agenda veto.16 In this case, the
groups C1, . . . , Ck that wield agenda vetoes correspond to the pivotal parties in gov-
ernment. In Germany, there is strong evidence that coalition partners have important
veto powers that are often formalised by written agreements between parties: ‘. . . a
formal coalition agreement . . . is signed prior to the Chancellor’s election by the
Bundestag. In the present coalition agreement it is stipulated that no decisions in
the Bundestag shall be taken with ‘changing majorities’ – that is, those forged
through the inclusion of votes from the opposition. This clause endows minority
groups of both parties, and of course the junior coalition partner as a whole, with
absolute veto power in intra-coalition policy making.17,18
The Cartel Thesis
The procedural cartel thesis stipulates that, if a majority government forms, then it will
also constitute an agenda cartel.19 For present purposes, we advance this thesis simply
as an empirical generalisation to be tested, rather than deriving it as a conclusion from
more primitive assumptions. This thesis is thus similar to Gamson’s Law – the obser-
vation that, if a multi-party government forms in a parliamentary system, then each
party’s share of portfolios will closely reflect its share of seats in the assembly.20
Both the claim that agenda vetoes are distributed to each pivotal party (the
parliamentary cartel thesis) and the claim that portfolios in parliamentary systems
are distributed proportionally to seat shares (Gamson’s Law) characterise the govern-
ment bargaining outcomes that emerge in equilibrium. Theoretical models of the
government formation process should then accommodate these empirical regularities,
to the extent that they are empirically validated. A primary purpose of this article is to
see how well the procedural cartel thesis applies to the German case.
TESTING THE PROCEDURAL CARTEL THESIS
Many studies of the legislative success of parliamentary governments examine the
proportion of bills introduced by the government that pass.21 Here, we examine roll
rates, rather than success rates. Operationally, if a majority of a party’s voting
members votes against a bill that nonetheless passes, we say that the party has been
rolled. Think of a legislative train leaving the station and a party that has tried to
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stop it – but has been run over. What one expects the roll rate of a governing party to be
depends on how one thinks the legislative agenda is determined.
The Floor Agenda Model
Suppose there is no agenda cartel and the plenary agenda is set by motions made and
voted on the floor, with all parties having equal chances to bring such motions. If we
assume that all parties can be placed along a traditional left–right scale, then this Floor
Agenda Model leads to a very simple expectation: the median party is never rolled,
while roll rates increase monotonically both to the left and to the right of the
median, regardless of government status.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The median party cannot be
rolled because it is not possible to form a majority that wants to move policy away
from the median in a unidimensional model. That roll rates increase to either side of
the median, F, can be illustrated by imagining that a particular status quo policy,
Q1, lies between two right-wing parties’ ideal points and that a bill proposing to
move policy leftward is passed (see Figure 1).22 The more extreme party (R2 in
Figure 1) will necessarily vote against the bill, as the bill will move policy farther
away from R2’s ideal point; hence, it will be rolled. The more moderate party (R1
in Figure 1) may in fact vote for the bill, if it is closer to the party’s ideal point, R1,
than is the status quo. In this case (pictured in Figure 1), the moderate party is not
rolled. Generalising this example, one can show that the roll rate of the more
extreme party must be at least as high as that of the more moderate party – and this
is true for parties and policies to the left of the median party (for example, for
parties L1 and L2, and status quo, Q2) as well.
FIGURE 1
THE FLOOR AGENDA MODEL (MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM) AND ROLL RATES
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Thus, we have a general test for the absence of an agenda cartel. If there is a clear
V-shaped pattern in party rolls, viewed across the left–right spectrum, then there
cannot be an agenda cartel.
The Cartel Agenda Model
If there is an agenda cartel (meaning each pivotal government party wields a de facto
veto), we should not see legislation reaching the floor that any governing party then
unsuccessfully opposes. For, any pivotal governing party that anticipates being
rolled on a particular bill should exercise its veto to prevent the bills appearance on
the plenary agenda.
Consider, as an example, the uni-dimensional policy space in Figure 2. The govern-
ment consists of two parties, with ideal points M and F. Party F is also the median party
in the assembly as a whole. The point m is the ideal point of a party in the opposition.
The Cartel Agenda Model predicts that the government will only schedule for a
vote those bills that ultimately (after any floor amendments) move policy closer to
both M and F. If the status quo is closer to M than is F – as is SQ1 in Figure 2 –
then no bill to change policy will be presented to the chamber by the government.
This is because M will anticipate that, if a bill changing a status quo policy like SQ1
is allowed onto the floor, then the bill will pass if and only if it moves policy toward
F and away from M. Thus, as shown in Figure 2, all proposals to change status quo
points lying in the set [2M-F, F] will be blocked by the government (pursuant to
demands made by M).23 Thus, we have the following hypothesis:
H1) Under complete information with costless gatekeeping, the roll rate of
governmental parties will be zero.24
FIGURE 2
AGENDA CONTROL MODEL FOR THE BUNDESTAG
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The opposition (or minority) party, by contrast, will be rolled – every time the
status quo lies in the opposition roll zone, that is, the interval between F and 2m-F.
Thus, bills to change status quos such as SQ2 will be brought to the floor, will pass,
and will thus roll party m. This logic leads to the roll rates described in Figure 3 and
to our second hypothesis:
H2) The roll rate of opposition parties should be higher than the roll rate of gov-
ernmental parties.
Because the government will not allow any bill onto the agenda when M (the leftmost
member of the governing coalition) prefers the status quo to F (the floor median), the
distance between M and F should not affect the government’s roll rate (decreases in M
merely stretch the blockout zone leftward and the government will still block all pro-
posals to change status quos within [2M-F, F]). In contrast, an opposition party’s roll
rate will be positively related to the distance between m and F (as m increases, 2m-F
increases, stretching the minority party roll zone). Moreover, as an opposition party’s
distance from F (the position of the median voter) increases, so should its roll rate.
Thus:
H3) The roll rate of an opposition party should increase the farther its median
ideal point (m) is from the floor median (F). That is, the greater jm-Fj, the
greater an opposition party’s roll rate, all else constant.
To see how agenda-setting power can affect legislative outcomes, imagine a newly
elected legislature and the set of existing government policies (we could label each one
SQ1, SQ2, . . . ,SQn as in Figure 2) that it faces. Each of these policies could in principle
FIGURE 3
CARTEL AGENDA MODEL AND ROLL RATES
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be adjusted, sliding them further to the left or right (for example, less generous or more
generous unemployment benefits). The newly elected members and their parties have
opinions regarding how each of the n policies ideally should be positioned along their
respective left–right dimensions. Denote the centre of legislative opinion (the median
ideal position) regarding each policy by F1, . . . ,Fn for the n policies (one such policy is
depicted in Figure 2).
One can divide existing government policies into two main categories, depending
on the relationship between the legislative median (Fj) and the status quo (SQj). In one
category are policies that lie to the left of the current centre of legislative opinion
(SQj , Fj). If the legislature votes to change such a policy from the status quo (for
example, SQ1 in Figure 2) to the floor median (for example, F in Figure 2), the
result will be a rightward policy move.25 In the second main category are policies
that lie to the right of the current centre of legislative opinion (SQj . Fj). If the legis-
lature votes on a bill to change such a policy from the status quo (for example, SQ2 in
Figure 2) to the floor median (F ), the result will be a leftward policy move.
It follows from our analysis of blockout and roll zones that, leftist governments,
such as depicted in Figure 2, move most policies leftward. That is, most policy
changes will change status quos such as SQ2 to F. Rightward policy moves within
the blockout zone will be vetoed by the government. Some rightward policy moves
will be possible, changing status quos to the left of 2M-F in Figure 2 to F. In these
cases, we expect large, if not unanimous coalitions to be in favour of the moves,
making both the government and opposition parties better off. Thus, the only excep-
tions to the rule that leftist governments will move policy leftward should be combined
with large, if not unanimous, votes. Similarly, most rightist party policy moves should
be rightward or nearly unanimous.26 Thus:
H4) Policy should usually move leftward if the government is left-of-centre and
rightward if the government is right-of-centre. Changes in government will, all
else constant, change the direction of policy movement.
This result may seem obvious, but notice that, if the Floor Agenda Model holds, then
policy moves will come from both directions, as shifting coalitions form and agree to
move policy. It is only if the government forms an agenda cartel, and thereby agrees to
avoid shifting coalitions, that a strong association between the political cast of the gov-
ernment and the direction of policy movement is to be expected. Thus, examining roll
rates provides an appropriate test of whether the prohibition on ‘changing majorities’ to
which Germany’s governing parties typically agree is binding in practice.
HYPOTHESES ABOUT DIVIDED GOVERNMENT
In this section, we state several hypotheses about the effect of divided government (that
is, divided control of the Bundestag and Bundesrat) in Germany. If an opposition party
wields a veto in the second chamber, and the second chamber can block first-chamber
proposals, then the party can use its veto to stop proposals that would roll it. If the
second chamber holds only a dilatory or suspensory veto, the majority coalition
there can use it to delay the government’s enactments and may, by threatening to
delay, extract concessions from the government. In this way, the majority coalition
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in the Bundesrat can reduce the offensiveness of some of the government’s proposals
and by so doing reduce the roll rates of their comrades in the Bundestag. Thus:
H5) Divided government should decrease the roll rates of opposition parties that
hold a veto in the other chamber (for example, when they are in the majority in
the other chamber), all else constant.
H6) We should see more unanimous or nearly unanimous votes during divided
government, all else constant.
If the majority coalition in chamber A of a bicameral legislature can place items on the
agenda of chamber B, then divided government should lead to a loss of agenda control
in chamber B. Proposals that would otherwise be blocked by the government or
majority in chamber B will get some plenary time and could roll the majority or gov-
ernment parties. This is equivalent to a change in the structure of the first stage of the
game described in the earlier section, whereby the government or majority parties no
longer have a monopoly on the agenda. Instead, some fraction of the agenda is con-
trolled by another party. Also, the opposition may use its power in the other
chamber, either through gatekeeping or proposing, to create a bargain, or logroll,
with the majority or governmental parties. This bargain may include placing items
in the agenda that end up rolling the government or majority parties and/or moving
policy away from the government/majority. Thus:
H7) Divided government should, all else constant, increase the roll rates of gov-
ernmental parties.
H8) Divided government should reduce the proportion of proposals that move
policy toward the ideal points of the government parties, all else constant.
DATA
We test these hypotheses using roll call votes recorded in the Bundestag between 1980
and 2002 for six legislative periods,27 namely the ninth through fourteenth Wahlpers.28
Recorded votes take place when a parliamentary group or 31 members request them
and they usually concern hotly debated issues of major policy.
There were 701 recorded votes during from 1980 to 2002 (excluding confidence
motions, veto overrides, and constitutional amendments, which require more than a
simple majority of votes) and of these, 259 were final passage roll call votes on bills
and committee recommendations. It is from these final passage votes that we calculate
each party’s roll rate and the direction of policy moves.29
Party j is rolled if and only if more of its members vote ‘no’ on the motion to pass a
bill than vote ‘yes’ and the bill passes.30 Party j’s roll rate is simply the total number of
times it is rolled in a given time period, divided by the total number of votes held in that
period.
In calculating roll rates, and later policy moves, a question arises about the time
period to use. Calculating these measures for each Wahlper would seem natural and
most of our results are presented on this basis. The problem is, however, that multiple
Land elections take place during any given Wahlper, which are usually seen as tests of
the federal government’s popularity. These elections change the number of seats held
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by the federal government and opposition in the Bundesrat. These changes frequently
affect whether the government faces unified or divided control of the Bundesrat.
Changes in Bundesrat representation have also resulted from the addition of new
La¨nder. In particular, German unification in 1990, by incorporating five eastern
La¨nder, altered the political character of the Bundesrat.31 Therefore, each time the
balance of power between government and opposition changes in the Bundesrat, we
can have a new observation for each party and its roll rate. We call these time
periods legislative sub periods.32 Thus, the dependent variable in the following analysis
is either the roll rate of each party during each of the ninth to fourteenth Wahlpers, in
which case we have 26 party-Wahlper observations, or the roll rate of each party during
each legislative sub-period, in which case we have 78 party-sub-period observations.
There are five parties in the Bundestag during this period, namely the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU/CSU), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Social Demo-
cratic Party (SPD), the Green Party (GRN), and the Party of Democratic Socialism
(PDS). The PDS, as the successor to the SED, came into existence in 1990, with the
unification of Western and Eastern Germany. The Greens gained representation start-
ing with the tenth Wahlper.
During the ninth Wahlper, SPD and FDP began in government. In our analysis,
Wahlper 9 includes only the SPD – FDP government (called Wahlper 9.1), before
the change in government that took place in 1982, when CDU/CSU and FDP took
over (there were only four votes during this second part of the Wahlper, not enough
to create a Wahlper 9.2 for analysis). During legislatures 10–13, CDU/CSU and
FDP constituted the government. With the fourteenth Wahlper, the SPD and Greens
formed the new government.33
BASIC RESULTS
Hypotheses H1 and H2
Roll rates for the government and opposition parties in the Bundestag are given in
column 3 in Table 1. As can be seen, the government parties’ roll rate averages
about 1 per cent. This average is substantively very close to zero and is on par with
TABLE 1
MEAN BUNDESTAG ROLL RATES FOR GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION PARTIES WHEN IN
MINORITY VS. IN MAJORITY IN THE BUNDESRAT
Party in Bundesrat
In minority In majority Mean roll rates
Party in Bundestag Out of government 0.81
(0.14)
9 observations
0.66
(0.14)
16 observations
0.72
(0.15)
25 observations
In government 0.02
(0.03)
12 observations
0
(0)
8 observations
0.01
(0.02)
20 observations
Note: only trends with eight or more final passage votes included in this analysis. Cell entries give means,
standard deviations (in parentheses), and the number of observations.
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the roll rates of other government parties in parliaments around the world. Further
analysis shows that the government’s rolls occurred only during divided government
and were on substantively unimportant issues, so the consequential roll rate for the
government is virtually zero.34
As a rule, governmental parties vote together; in some rare instances, however, one
partner gets rolled while the other does not. In the twelfth Wahlper, during the CDU and
FDP government, CDU got rolled while FDP did not, on two abortion policy issues. In
these instances, FDP voted with the opposition, defecting on its coalition partner. In the
thirteenth Wahlper, there was one vote, on parliamentary reform, where FDP was rolled
and CDU was not, and in the fourteenth Wahlper, there was one vote, on the issue of
embryonic cell research, where the Greens were rolled but SPD was not.
What do these low roll rates for government parties mean? Thinking not just of
Germany, but of governments/majorities in general, low government roll rates mean
either that the government has structural advantages in setting the agenda; or that
the governing coalition votes cohesively on agenda-setting votes; or both. The mix
of structural advantage and disciplined voting can vary from case to case. For
example, the majority party in the US House of Representatives relies less on strict dis-
cipline and more on structural advantages than does the governing majority in the
Bundestag. US majorities take all committee chairs, whereas German majorities take
only a proportional share; and US majorities take a super-proportional share of seats
on the Rules Committee, whereas German majorities take only a proportional share
of seats on the Council of Elders; amendments to bills in the US House often roll the
majority party, but the government is never rolled on amendments in the Bundestag.35
Although it is true that German majorities rely relatively more on discipline and
less on structural advantages than do majorities in the US House, we would stress
that negotiating the plenary agenda off the floor (in the Council of Elders and,
before that, in talks among the governing partners) makes it easier to manage the
agenda than would a system in which the agenda were routinely constructed on the
floor, as the latter system presents a greater risk that a clever opposition motion can
divide the government. If, for example, one coalition partner champions farmers’ sub-
sidies but has agreed not to pursue increases during the current government, it will not
be happy to be forced repeatedly to vote down motions, introduced by a mischievous
opposition, to consider such subsidies. Lessening the opposition’s opportunities to
force votes on such mischievous motions is one advantage of endowing bodies like
the Council of Elders with agenda-setting authority.
For the opposition parties, the average roll rate is much higher, at 72 per cent. A
large part of these opposition rolls are votes on yearly budgets, but also on major
policy areas such as tax laws, civil rights (human rights policy), reduction and reloca-
tion of troops and UN army participation, regional planning and urban affairs, labour
market policy, social security, economic growth and state expenditure, nursing care,
abortion regulation, environmental issues, agriculture, immigration, health insurance
reform, privatisation and pension reform.
Hypothesis H3
In order to test hypothesis H3, we first needed to estimate the distance of opposition
(and governmental) parties from the chamber median on a left–right policy dimension.
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However, because we do not have a measure of ideological distance that has interval
level properties, we have used data from Budge et al.36 for the ninth to fourteenth
Wahlpers to identify the party farthest away (both on the left and on the right) from
the government coalition in each Wahlper. We call these variables DISTANCE-Ljt
(for the farthest left party) and DISTANCE-Rjt (for the farthest right party).
37 We
also estimate the distance of governmental parties from the chamber median
(DISTANCE_GOVTjt), and we expect to see a coefficient on this variable that is not
significantly different from 0.38
For a visual representation of how roll rates vary as a function of being in and out of
government in the Bundestag and as a function of the parties’ placement on the left–
right axis, we graph Wahlpers 12 and 13 in Figures 4 and 5. Parties are ranked accord-
ing to the left–right score assigned in the Manifesto Party Project by Budge et al.39
This variable, which we refer to as the MPP score, is shown on the x-axis, while roll
rates, varying from 0 to 1, are on the y-axis.40
These graphs illustrate visually the results we find in the following regression,
namely that government roll rates are not significantly different from 0, that opposition
roll rates are significantly different from 0, and that roll rates of opposition parties
increase the further away the party is from the governmental coalition median. The
one deviation from the finding that opposition parties’ roll rates increase the further
away they are from the left of the government is found in Wahlper 12 (Figure 4).
The SPD has a lower roll rate here because the opposition outnumbers the government
in the Bundesrat during this period of divided government.
These graphic results and their statistical significance are confirmed in the
regression below. We regressed ROLL RATEjt, the roll rate of party j during
FIGURE 4
WAHLPER 12 ROLL RATES OF GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION PARTIES, BY MPP SCORE
(FDP AND CDU GOVERNMENT)
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Wahlper t, on IN_GOVT_BUNDESTAGjt, DISTANCE-Ljt, DISTANCE-Rjt,
DISTANCE-GOVTjt and TRENDjt, the last variable to account for the downward
trend evident in German roll rates for all parties over this time period.41 This gives
us equation (1):
ROLL RATE jt ¼ aþ b1IN GOVT BUNDESTAGjt
þ b2DISTANCE-Ljt þ b3DISTANCE-Rjt
þ b4DISTANCE-GOVTjt þ b5TRENDjt þ 1jt, (1)
To estimate this equation, we employed the extended beta binomial regression method
(EBB) suggested by King42 and Palmquist,43 which deals with situations where the
dependent variable is an aggregation of individual binary choices that are likely not
independent of each other.44 The results in Table 2 show that, as hypothesised, the
opposition party farthest left from the government exhibits a significantly higher roll
rate than the opposition parties closer to the government. Again, the one deviation
from the finding that opposition parties’ roll rates increase as they are further away
to the left of the government is to be found during divided government in Wahlper 12.
The coefficient on the variable DISTANCE-Rjt is not significant. That is, there was
no difference in the roll rates for the two opposition parties, CDU and FDP, in the
fourteenth Wahlper (in which the SPD and Greens formed the government).
The variable that distinguishes the distance of governmental parties from the
chamber median (DISTANCE_GOVTjt), as expected, is not statistically different
than zero. We can also reject the null hypothesis that the effect of distance from the
FIGURE 5
WAHLPER 13 ROLL RATES OF GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION PARTIES, BY MPP SCORE
(FDP AND CDU GOVERNMENT)
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chamber median on the roll rates for opposition parties is 0 or negative. These results
serve to validate the key test of our theory, which is the comparative static presented in
hypothesis H3.
Hypothesis H4
As previously stated, policy should move toward the government and away from the
opposition, but divided government should decrease the proportion of policy moves
toward the government. In order to compute policy moves and their direction, we com-
puted a one-dimensional Optimal Classification on German roll call votes and used
this, together with the pattern of yea and nay votes, to determine a cutpoint for each
vote.45 The cutpoint determines the point in policy space that separates the yes and
no votes. Figure 6 offers an example of how cutpoints can help us identify policy
moves. This figure shows a typical move toward the government and away from oppo-
sition parties during Wahlper 12.
During Wahlper 12, with the FDP and CDU/CSU in government, the left–right
ranking of parties produced by OC is presented in Figure 6. Knowing that both FDP
and CDU/CSU voted in favour of the bill, that all opposition parties voted against
the bill, and that the bill passed, we can conclude that the policy moves toward the gov-
ernmental parties and away from the opposition parties.46 Similarly for all Wahlpers,
we look at bills that passed and coded whether the policy move was towards the
TABLE 2
ROLL RATES BY PARTY-WAHLPER FOR GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
PARTIES, ESTIMATED BY EBB
Dependent variable: party j’s roll rate in Wahlper t
Coefficient
(std. error)
Z statistic
IN_GOVT_BUNDESTAGjt 25.072
(.551)
2 9.20
DISTANCE-Ljt
(Opposition party ranked furthest to the left from government in each
Wahlper, by Budge et al.)
.738
(.229)
3.21
DISTANCE-Rjt
(Opposition party ranked furthest to the right from government in
each Wahlper, by Budge et al.)
2.267
(.37)
2 .72
DISTANCE-GOVTjt
(Non-median government party in each Wahlper, by Budge et al.)
.075
(.842)
.09
TRENDjt
(Wahlper)
2.084
(.021)
2 3.99
Constant 1.818
(.318)
5.71
LR Chi2 740.21
N 23
 indicates p , .05;  indicates p , .01, 1-tailed test
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government and away from the opposition or the reverse. We only consider bills that
passed for the policy moves analysis, since failed bills cannot be policy moves.
In this analysis, we also include only those bills where the cutpoint indicates an
unambiguous move toward either the government or the opposition parties. We do
not utilise the very few votes that split the government coalition because we cannot
always determine a direction of policy change in these cases.47 We hope to explore
in more depth in future research the dynamics of coalition disagreements and how
agenda control breaks down when coalition partners disagree. For now, we discard
these moves as ambiguous from the point of view of our theory. We also exclude unan-
imous votes, where policy moved toward both government and opposition.
Table 3 presents the proportion of policy moves toward the government for each
Wahlper.
Overall, for Wahlpers 9–14, the proportion of policy moves toward the government
is 99 per cent; in fact there are only two policy movements away from the governmen-
tal coalition parties out of 196 policy moves. There is one policy move opposed by both
government parties (CDU/CSU and FDP) during Wahlper 13 that concerned criminal
law, and one policy move opposed by both government parties, the SPD and Greens
during the fourteenth, on the issue of the reconstruction of the Palace of the Kaiser.
RESULTS REGARDING DIVIDED GOVERNMENT
We have argued above that divided government may increase government roll rates
(H5), increase unanimous roll calls (H6), decrease opposition roll rates (H7), and
decrease policy moves toward the government (H8). Before examining the empirical
FIGURE 6
EXAMPLE OF A POLICY MOVE TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT AND AWAY FROM THE
OPPOSITION, WAHLPER 12
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evidence regarding these propositions, we should note that the effects of divided gov-
ernment may be lessened by the means through which the government overcomes
divided government situations in Germany. These include allocation of funds to
Land governments, which is key for the government to buy off votes in the Bundesrat.48
Some examples are famous. In 1999, on the decision of the German nationality law,
the SPD–Green government negotiated a deal with the SPD–FDP government of
Rhineland-Palatinate and thereby secured a majority in the Bundesrat. Similarly, in
July 2000, on tax reform, the government secured a Bundesrat majority by ‘buying
off’ votes. As in American politics, the coin of the realm consisted of special
favours and projects.
Hypotheses H5 and H7
This section compares roll rates during unified and divided government. Coding occur-
rences of divided government, however, can be problematic. The power of the La¨nder
in the Bundesrat provides an institutional basis for divided government that is lacking
in most parliamentary regimes. The voting unit in the Bundesrat is the Land, not the
party. So, we coded the composition of the Bundesrat by computing the number of
seats held by the governmental parties together as well as the number of seats held
by opposition parties together. The coding of Land election results indicates parties
in government at the Land level. This was a rather complicated process because
Land government coalitions may not be entirely identical with the Bundestag
coalitions, or they may be a mix of opposition and government parties, as in a grand
coalition of the SPD and CDU.
Following Sturm’s49 calculations, we considered a Land to be controlled by the
government if the Land coalition was composed of: (1) a single governmental party;
or (2) a number of governmental parties (some or all); or (3) one or more governmental
parties plus some (small) regional party (that may not have seats in the Bundestag; this
applies primarily to SPD–PDS coalitions). On the side of the opposition, we con-
sidered as opposition-controlled those Land governments made up of: (1) a single
opposition party; or (2) a number of opposition parties (some or all).50
A party is coded in the majority in the Bundesrat if together with its coalition part-
ners it holds more seats than the opposition parties. Thus, the status of parties in the
second chamber is a dummy variable indicating whether each party and its coalition
partners had a majority of seats in the second chamber.
Looking back, Table 1 displays the mean roll rates, standard deviations (in parenth-
eses), as well as the number of observations for each category, for government and
TABLE 3
PROPORTION OF POLICY MOVES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT
Wahlper
9.1
Wahlper
10
Wahlper
11
Wahlper
12
Wahlper
13
Wahlper
14 Total
Moves toward the
government (%)
100 100 100 100 98 96 99
Moves away from the
government (%)
0 0 0 0 2 4 1
Total number of votes 9 33 54 30 47 23 196
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opposition parties, when they hold a majority in the Bundesrat and when they do not.
We see that holding a majority in the second chamber does in fact decrease opposition
party roll rates by 15 percentage points. By contrast, the increase in the roll rates for the
parties within the government is small (from 0 to 2 per cent) when those parties do not
control a majority of votes in the Bundesrat. These results suggest that the Bundesrat
does exercise some degree of agenda power and that the topic deserves further study.
Changes in the composition of the governing coalition should also change each
party’s roll rate. Thus, when the CDU/CSU–FDP coalition loses its majority and is
replaced by the SPD–Green coalition, we should see a corresponding change in
each of the four parties’ roll rates. Roll rates for the PDS, which is never in government,
by contrast, should not change. Roll rates for the CDU/CSU and FDP increase from an
average of 2 per cent during Wahlper 13 to 49 per cent in Wahlper 14 when these
parties no longer form the government. By contrast, the roll rates for the Greens and
SPD go from 69 per cent and 52 per cent respectively in the thirteenth Wahlper to 4
per cent and 2 per cent respectively in the fourteenth Wahlper. The roll rate for the
PDS, whose status did not change during this period, remained stable between 71
per cent to 74 per cent from the thirteenth to the fourteenth Wahlper.
To test the effect of joining and leaving the government in both chambers, we
compare the classic coalition partners – CDU/CSU and FDP, who were in government
together (Wahlpers 10–13), as well as SPD and Greens, who were in government
together as of 1998 (Wahlper 14). We estimate two regressions, based on the same
equation (3):
ROLL RATEjt ¼ aþ b1IN GOVT BUNDESTAG
þ b2IN GOVT BUNDESRAT þ 1, (3)
In equation (3), IN_GOVT_BUNDESTAG is a dummy indicating if the party is in
government or out of government in the Bundestag and IN_GOVT_BUNDESRAT is a
dummy indicating if the party is in government (that is, in the majority coalition) or out
of government in the Bundesrat. Using EBB regression, we generated the results
presented in Table 4.51
Moving in and out of government in the Bundestag significantly reduces the roll
rates of the coalition partners CDU/CSU and FDP, although moving in and out of
the majority in the Bundesrat, in and of itself, does not have a significant effect on
CDU/CSU and FDP roll rates. This is largely the result of this coalition’s control
over the Bundestag for most of the period under study.
If we run the same regression for the other coalition partners, the SPD and Greens,
which are in government only during Wahlper 14, we see a much higher effect of the
Bundesrat status change, which is shown by results presented in Table 5.52 These
results again suggest an effect for divided government.
Hypothesis H6
We should also see more unanimous votes on major policy issues during divided gov-
ernment. There are six unanimous votes during the six legislatures we examined and all
occurred during periods of divided government. Inherently consensual issues are either
AGENDA CONTROL IN THE BUNDESTAG, 1980 – 2002 105
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
—2
iti , l j ri t t.
l i j ri c iti
rt ll t, ll
l O t r t
t l j ri f r t. l t r t
f r t
iti f r i liti l l
rt ll CDU/CSU—FDP liti j rit
— r li l i
f ’ ll . l , r t,
t l t l CDU/CSU
f t ri t
t l
r ctiv l t
t t cti l t ll
, t i t ri ri , i t l t
t t t
f f i t ,
i liti — / S , t
0- ), ll ,
f l ). ti i ,
ti
]-l:ot +B11N_GOVT_BUNDESTA
-1- B2I _GOVT_BUN RA +8
ti T ti rt
t f t A
ti rt t , j ri li
f r t. i i , r t l
t 51
f t i i ca l ll
f liti / S , l i f
j ri r t, f lf, t i i ca t f
/ S ll . l lt f li tr l
t t f ri t
i liti , ,
l i , f f
t t l t 52
l i t f i
i
l l i j li ri i
t i i ri i i ll
i f t r tl l i
more likely to be taken up under divided government, or inherently conflictual issues
are more likely to be compromised under divided government.
Hypothesis H8
Does divided government decrease the proportion of policy moving towards the
government as predicted? Table 6 shows the proportion of policy moves toward the
government during divided and unified government.
During unified government, the proportion of moves toward the government is 100
per cent during the six legislative periods. This figure drops to 98 per cent during
divided government – that is, there were only two policy moves away from the gov-
ernment during Wahlpers 13 and 14 and both occurred under divided government.
Further, under centre-right CDU/CSU–FDP coalitions (Wahlpers 10–13), govern-
ment policy moved rightward in 99.5 per cent of cases, while when the SPD–FDP and
SPD–Green centre-left coalitions were in government (Wahlpers 9 and 14), policy
moved leftward 98 per cent of the time. We expected that leftist coalitions should
move policy leftward and rightist coalitions should move policy rightward. This
differs from the expectations under the Floor Agenda Model, where policy change
should be determined simply by the distribution of status quo points.53
TABLE 4
THE EFFECT OF CDU/CSU – FDP BEING IN
GOVERNMENT IN THE BUNDESTAG AND BUNDESRAT
ON THEIR ROLL RATES
Coefficient (Z score)
IN_GOVT_BUNDESTAG 24.474 (29.66)
IN_GOVT_BUNDESRAT 2.694 (21.85)
Constant .35 (1.21)
Log likelihood 290.432408
Pseudo R2 .45
N 32
indicates p , .05; indicates p , .01, 1–tailed test.
TABLE 5
THE EFFECT OF COALITION PARTNERS SPD AND
GREENS BEING IN GOVERNMENT IN THE
BUNDESTAG AND BUNDESRAT ON ROLL RATES
Coefficient (Z score)
IN_GOVT_BUNDESTAG 25.308 (27.92)
IN_GOVT_BUNDESRAT 21.937 (25.43)
Constant 2.453 (7.64)
Log likelihood 2208.28649
Pseudo R2 .37
N 32
indicates p , .05; indicates p , .01, 1–tailed test.
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CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by
government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero
roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, oppo-
sition parties’ roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor median,
while roll rates for government parties do not respond to changes in their distance from
the floor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition
and the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government. Fourth, changes
in government and opposition in the Bundestag cause changes in roll rates and the
direction of policy movement, with roll rates for government parties skyrocketing
when they fall into the opposition and vice versa for opposition parties, while policy
movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist gov-
ernment to 100 per cent leftward under a leftist government.
These results for Germany are similar to those previously found in Japan,54 the
US55 and several other assemblies. Germany conforms to the ‘procedural cartel
thesis’ we articulated earlier in the paper.
We have also examined the effect that divided government has on the legislative
process. First, we have examined whether being in the majority in the Bundesrat can
reduce the roll rate of parties, which are out of government in the Bundestag and
found a difference in the expected direction. Second, we examined whether divided
government reduces the proportion of policy moves toward the government and
again found a difference in the expected direction (not significant). Third, we examined
whether voting is more consensual during divided government and found that all the
unanimous votes in our dataset occur during divided government.
It is worth noting that the effects of divided government might be greater than we
have documented here, as the effects may be masked by actors’ strategic behavior. For
instance, unanimous bills increase in frequency under divided government, presumably
because the government compromises with the coalition controlling the Bundesrat.
However, governmental agenda setters may also strategically refrain from introducing
bills that cannot pass in the Bundesrat.56 Such restraint would change the government’s
agenda in a way not captured by our battery of statistics.
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TABLE 6
PROPORTION OF POLICY MOVES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT DURING DIVIDED
GOVERNMENT
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Moves toward the government 98%
(99 policy moves)
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Moves away from the government 2%
(2 policy moves)
0%
(0 policy moves)
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teenth Wahlpers; indeed, these were the only two Wahlpers where there existed a farthest right party that
was not in the government.
38. For our DISTANCE_GOVT measure, we treat the interior government party as the median and the
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